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between the circle and the parabola. In the circle you confine yourself to what is within a certain limited boundary. In the parabola you have on one side this same limited boundary, but on the other it reaches out to the infinite. Inasmuch as you have to deal with individual minds and imaginations—souls, if you will—which are reaching to the infinite in all directions, you cannot separate these two. But the one thing you have to remember is that out of your own personality will come the influence with which you mold the child. And so, whether we are teaching religion or teaching morality, let us remember that in the teaching of these things the best of our teachers will rise till they touch the spheres.”

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SELF-ESTEEM AND THE LOVE OF RECOGNITION AS SOURCES OF CONDUCT.

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ONE of the most important sources of conduct is to be found in the feelings aroused by what we think of ourselves, and by what we care for what others think of us. The social environment in which we live approves of certain types of conduct, while it disapproves of others; it places a valuation on certain capacities and qualities, while there are other characteristics that it just as positively condemns. The thought that we are possessed of qualities that have value in the eyes of our fellows, or that our conduct has been meritorious, is a source of pleasure to ourselves rather than of indifference or of displeasure, we have a “feeling of pride”; contrariwise, the thought that our conduct in any matter has been unworthy arouses a painful feeling, we are ashamed. The habitude that is fostered by these particular pleasurable

feelings at the thought of our worth constitutes the feeling-disposition which we call self-esteem, showing itself in a variety of forms such as vanity, pride, haughtiness.

Unfortunately there has ever been great laxity in the use of these various terms, so that a certain opprobrium has become attached to all of them.¹ This is to be regretted because it is liable to lead teachers into the error of attempting to eradicate an inherent proclivity of the child's nature, instead of utilizing this potent propensity to the end of securing desired results in conduct. A more nearly perfect analysis of the nature of self-esteem in its various forms certainly shows how the same may be made a most efficient means of securing proper development along moral lines. Adam Smith goes so far as to say that the "secret of education is to direct vanity to proper objects."²

It is evident that the opinion that an individual may form as to his ability or capacity, as to his worth or merit, need not necessarily be correct; in fact, it is more likely to be faulty. Furthermore, it is more apt to be too favorable than too unfavorable. The mistake in judgment may be due to the individual's imagining that he possesses meritorious qualities that he does not possess, or that he does not possess in the degree in which he thinks he does. This form of self-esteem we call *conceit*. Where the mistake in judgment is due to the actual possession of qualities of supposed merit or of only trifling merit, such as good looks, pretty clothes and the like, we have the form of self-esteem called *vanity*. Again, there may be an overestimation of the true worth of qualities or possessions that have greater social value, such as energy, will power, intellectual ability, learning, money, family connections. This is the habitude that is properly

¹ Ruskin, for instance, says: "I have been more and more convinced, the more I think of it, that in general pride is at the bottom of all great mistakes." He really means haughtiness, for elsewhere he defines pride as a "looking down on others because of their true inferiority to us."

² "Moral Sentiments," VI, p. 3.

called *false pride*, which is liable to be accompanied by a looking-down on others as inferiors, when it is called *haughtiness*. Where there is a just estimation of the true worth of the individual, we have *true pride*.

From the fact that the pleasures of self-esteem are valued so highly by us, there is in our nature an inherent tendency to preserve intact our good opinion of self. Where our regard for self—really our concern to preserve intact the pleasures of self-esteem—keeps us from performing certain actions deemed unworthy of ourselves, we call the attitude *self-respect*. But what we consider to be unworthy is, for most of us, determined by what our social environment considers to be unworthy. What is ordinarily called self-respect really is dependent, in the great majority of cases, on what people generally think regarding such matters.

On the other hand, an individual may care more for what some particular class, clique or social set thinks regarding these things, and under this head might be grouped such habitudes as the sense of honor and the sense of propriety. Similarly an individual may ignore what people generally, as well as what particular classes or groups, think concerning what is worthy and unworthy, and base his conduct on his own views concerning such matters; then we are liable to call the attitude *pride*,³ and this may be either true or false. If the standard that determines his opinion is a true one, society will be the gainer ultimately, even if in his individualistic attitude he has been nonconforming to her present standard.

The very young child necessarily places his valuation upon what to the mature person might amount to nothing or to trifles. There are but few of his physical organs and mental capabilities that he has learned to use well as viewed by the adult. But it is just such exercise that calls forth words and signs of recognition, praise from

³ We call it pride because the individualistic, nonconformist attitude taken must strike us as presumptuous and overweening.

his parents and other grown-up acquaintances. It is such recognition that arouses in the little tot the flush of pleasure. So when he has mastered a new feat in the way of physical gymnastic or can pronounce a new "big" word or has learned a new fact, he must show it off to his elders, to receive the new pleasure due to the recognition of his new achievement. He is not content with the new achievement, nor even with the thought that this new achievement is the *potential* means of securing the pleasure due to recognition by others. He must *actually* receive that added pleasure. The mere consciousness of his own ability (to his mind, his own worth) does not furnish him with sufficient pleasure; it must be reinforced by actual recognition from others.

By the time he comes to school, matters have not changed much, nor is there likely to be much of a change during school age unless he is here subjected to wise guidance. With advancing age he will gradually pride himself less upon these lesser things and more on the things that have greater social value, as physical strength, agility, endurance, keenness of perception, retentiveness of memory, accuracy of judgment, power of critical analysis; ability to excel in debate, oratory, music or other accomplishments; scholarship, wealth, family connections, ancestry. Such pride, false as it is, is not necessarily productive of great harm, provided that it mark only this transition period, and that the process be not arrested at this stage of the child's development. Should it, however, be brought to a stop at this point, it will result in some form of that grievous distemper, haughtiness, such as the overweening and patronizing arrogance of the familiar "man of family," the pompous snobishness of the wealthy upstart, the vulgar affectation of "cultuah" of the society-butterfly product of certain female seminaries, the supercilious self-sufficiency of the half-baked scholar who likes to dwell in thought, at least, on the fact of his belonging to the "aristocracy of learning"—all maladies symptomatic of a deeper-seated

ailment: the lack of real intellectual or cultural development.

Under proper guidance he will learn to see that even though these things have value, or may have it, they do not reflect merit on the possessor, being in the main gifts of nature. When he sees that rugged physical constitution and perspicacity of intellect, desirable as they may be, redound no more to his credit than he is blameworthy for being a cripple or being afflicted with an impediment of speech, there will be a new shifting of the basis of his self-esteem; for now he will begin to realize that the true worth of a man depends on the proper use of the powers with which he has been endowed. In other words, his pride will now gradually become a moral pride, *i. e.*, a pride based on moral factors. His question will not longer be: "What exceptional qualities do I possess?" qualities which he realizes are accidents of birth, but instead: "What proper, *i. e.*, what moral, use do I make of the capabilities bestowed upon me?" As a result it will be his endeavor to bring about a corresponding development in his own character. As he grows in the direction of truthfulness, fidelity to duty, faithfulness to friends, scrupulosity of conscience, adherence to principle, he is approximating toward the ideal development of self-esteem. But it is just at this stage that there is danger of developing the false moral pride of the "unco guid," the self-righteous attitude of the Pharisee who prides himself in his self-complacency on not being "as other men." It still is false pride for the simple reason that it is *exclusive*.

True pride is always accompanied by true modesty and true humility. It is not puffed up or overweening like the false moral pride of the Pharisee. Lao-tse with pithy brevity says: "Inferior virtue never loses sight of virtue. Therefore it has no virtue." The true modesty and humility here mentioned are not to be confounded with that false modesty and false humility that are the characteristic guise of the self-seeking, canting hypocrite, that false

modesty which shows itself in insincere and ostentatious self-disparagement, and that false humility observed in the fawning servility of that abomination of abominations, the cringing, self-debasing, tuft-hunting toady.⁴ Neither are they found in the undue self-depreciation of those unfortunates who have been buffeted about by the calamitous vicissitudes of life until they have lost all confidence in self, if not faith in human nature. The modesty here spoken of is rather a dignified, tactful, unostentatious reserve due to the possessor's just appreciation of his real ability and true worth. He fully realizes that the recognition that ordinarily comes to men is not based on true *worth*, but instead on social *value* due to exceptional gift; that, therefore, in so far as recognition coming to him is due to his possession of unusual capabilities—the result of accident of birth or contingency of training—it is not due him; that, therefore, he is receiving a disproportionate share of that recognition which should be distributed on a more nearly just basis.⁵ Similarly, the humility here spoken of is the natural habiliment of the person who sufficiently recognizes the frailties, the foibles and the failings of human nature, and is fully imbued with the sense of his own incompetency in view of the exalted demands of the moral law that he is trying to take as his guide.⁶

⁴ Where Goethe says, "Only knaves are modest," he is thinking of this feigned modesty.

⁵ The etymology of the German word for modest, *bescheiden*, is significant; it meant at one time, *to be well informed*.

⁶ The contention of theologians in times past as well as of such and others of the present day, to the point that pride is always an undesirable attitude, cannot be well taken. If it be entirely proper to feel *shame* at the thought of having been guilty of unworthy conduct, why should it not be equally proper to feel its opposite, *i. e., pride*, at the thought of having done something worthy? Calling the resultant feeling by another name will not change its nature either; for the gratification, satisfaction or pleasure one experiences under such circumstances is just the very feeling that we term pride. A great many writers call the desirable development of self-esteem self-respect, as, for instance, Fowler, "Principles of Morals," Part II, p. 64. To the present writer it seems more accurate to use the term self-respect in designation of that habitude *before* an

When self-esteem has reached this point in the course of development, we have its desirable climax. In place of mere *contemplation* of one's powers, it has now secured their proper *application*. It is no longer exclusive. It now demands for self no more respect or recognition than it would see accorded to others. Its concern now is to preserve intact true human dignity not only in self, but equally so in others. Probably it is now less a respect for self than it is a respect for the human nature element in self, *i. e.*, less a personal regard for self than it is an impersonal regard for human nature. It is only then that it can secure the adherence to such a maxim of conduct as Kant's: "So act that you always consider mankind, not only in your own person but in the person of every other, not simply as a means, but at the same time as an end." It is only then that it can see that there is possible such a thing as unworthy treatment of even the basest of men. The question could well be debated whether regard for self has not been transformed into a regard for the moral law. In order to realize the *end*, the securing of true personal worthiness, attention and endeavor had to become focused on moral conduct as the *means* to this end; thus moral conduct became the *aim* of effort, until at last, by the strange workings of that interesting psychological phenomenon, the substitution of motives, it became the end or goal to which the individual was objectively driven, perhaps even without his realizing it.⁷

action to be performed, in which we think of the worthiness or unworthiness of the action to be performed; on the other hand, the pleasurable feeling and corresponding feeling-disposition coming as the *result* of an action considered worthy, is pride. Self-respect would be the *prospective* phase of self-esteem, pride its *retrospective* phase.

"Jodl, "Lehrbuch der Psychologie," II, 334, second edition, calls attention to the significance of self-esteem to the individual in these words: "Without the counterpoise which is to be found in our self-appraisement, we should be as thoroughly prostrated by the pressure of the indifference and condemnation encamped about us . . . as we should be crushed by the atmosphere surrounding us were it not for the resistance offered by the air contained within our own body."

THE LOVE OF RECOGNITION.

The pleasures of self-esteem, largely due to what we think of ourselves, are enhanced or reinforced by recognition on the part of others. We can very properly speak of an inherent love of the recognition of our own merit or supposed merit. It includes the pleasures due to any form of expressed appreciation by others. Where it is directed toward commendation or praise by individuals we have become accustomed to call it the *love of approbation*. Where it is directed toward public recognition, as, for instance, in the form of honors or popular demonstration of esteem, we speak of it as the *love of honors*. From the fact that approbation and honors are pleasurable it would but follow that a love for these things would naturally be accompanied by a striving to secure them. And so the love of approbation frequently manifests itself as a striving to secure approbation, as, for instance, in vanity. Similarly, the love of honors is apt to show itself in a striving to secure honors—*ambition*.

In this regard for the good opinion of others we have one of the most potent means of securing moral conduct; in the eyes of some of our great thinkers, as, for instance, Locke, regard for the opinion of others is in fact the whole source of conduct. The most depraved approximate toward an entire disregard for the opinion of others; even there we find left a concern for the good opinion of certain of their fellow-men, even if not for that of society at large, *e. g.*, “honor among thieves.” At the other extreme, in the great leaders of thought, we also find a seeming disregard for public opinion; but even here the thought that public opinion at some later day will approve of the stand now disapproved of no doubt is a partial source of the sustaining power and fortitude that enables the reformer to remain true to his ideals. And certainly in the case of the non-exceptional it is most clear that regard for the good opinion of others is a most potent means of securing conduct in conformity with the

standards of the day. A proper regard for the esteem of others is therefore not only permissible, but desirable.

But just as a proper regard for any other good may, by being too constantly entertained, become transformed into an *inordinate* desire in that direction, so here. Proper self-regard or self-love may be nursed until it becomes an undue self-regard or self-love, namely, selfishness or egoism. Now outside of our desire for the creature comforts, this very habitude, the love of recognition of our ability or merit, when inordinate, includes all the selfishness there is; for the greed for wealth and the love of power, when carefully analyzed, will be found to consist largely of this love of recognition, or, as Aristotle says: "Wealth and power are eligible because of the honor they confer."

The very young child, seeing the great disparity that exists between his own ability and that of his elders, would be crushed with the consciousness of this difference were it not for the recognition that he constantly receives for what ability he does possess, and what worth he is made to think he possesses. It is due to this principle that he is so much more in need of external reinforcement of his self-esteem than are older people; and it is due to the same cause that he naturally tends to "show off," manifesting the working of a power that Mother Nature has bestowed upon him to enable him to secure that recognition that he needs as much as he does his daily nourishment. When he needs bread, it will not do to give him a stone. Similarly, it will not do to pamper and overfeed him with seductive sweets in place of giving him a sane diet of *wholesome* recognition.

As he grows in ability and his consciousness of the same, he becomes more self-sustaining in his self-esteem; there is less need of reinforcement from without. Furthermore, with the increase of experience and intelligent judgment, he becomes more discriminative as to the value of the recognition coming from various sources and in different forms. He learns to care more for the

commendation that comes from those who to his mind possess superior judgment, or again for the approval that comes from those who to his mind have his interest at heart. It is apparent, of course, that he can be mistaken as to who has this superior judgment and as to who is his true friend. Similarly, he soon learns to see that there is a difference between recognition and recognition, and then it is that he will prefer the more precious praise sparingly given to the cheaper article spread broadcast, and still more to its base counterfeit, flattery. Again, when he has met with praise that was unlooked-for, he learns to value unsolicited approval more highly than that which is brought home only by overt efforts to secure it; his vanity changes to pride—he is “too proud to be vain.” Furthermore, other things equal, the expression of esteem on the part of many will give him greater pleasure than that of a few; in short, the love of approbation expands into a love of honors; parallel to it, the striving to secure approbation, vanity, changes into striving to secure honors, ambition. Unfortunately, there are dangers ahead. Will he be able to avoid them?

Recognition in any form, at least where it is genuine, is an expression of esteem or respect based on the real or supposed *worth* of the recipient. If this recognition could be bestowed, or if it would be bestowed, *only* on true worth, then the love of recognition could not lead the individual astray. Unfortunately, however, those who have it to give may, in the first place, be ignorant as to what constitutes true worth, and may thus put it on a wrong basis just as the vain person or person of false pride is mistaken as to what constitutes true worth. Again, others are not always able to recognize true merit when they meet with it, and may be deceived into taking a counterfeit for the genuine. What is more, perhaps, people sometimes bestow honors—supposed to be the token of esteem, honor or respect—on the basis of their individual likings, affections. As a result the individual

is misled in his endeavor to secure the esteem of his fellows by conforming to their opinions with regard to what constitutes the basis on which the token of esteem is rendered. But the greatest peril is found in the fact that we can have a good name or reputation without really possessing a good character, can be respected without being really respectable, can secure honors without being truly honorable. In place of making ourselves truly worthy, we can deceive others into believing that we are worthy where we are not. True worth can be secured only as the result of patient, persevering, painstaking endeavor in the direction of self-mastery in the duties to ourselves and others. It is a laborious and tedious and long-drawn-out process, full of misgiving, disillusionment and disappointment. How seductive the temptation to secure the sweets of recognition by a less toilsome process! It does not take us long to see that we can secure the tokens of recognition for worth, not only by offering true worth, but that we can *purchase* them by giving a counterfeit—mistaken for the genuine—or again, can get possession of them by *bribery*. We can, in short, gain preferment, rank, eminence through the actual *possession* of true worth, but as well, if not better, through *deception* as to our worth, and through *popularity* rather than fitness or worthiness. Of course, the latter two are really one, being simply the obverse and the reverse sides of the same counterfeit.

INSINCERITY GROWING OUT OF INORDINATE LOVE OF
RECOGNITION.

In what might be called the adolescence of inordinate love of recognition, the stage of conceit and vanity, the element of insincerity is hardly present. At best we could there speak of an innocent, unconscious disingenuousness, showing itself in an instinctive tendency to draw attention to self, or rather toward those qualities or characteristics that are held to be meritorious, while at

the same time trying to conceal weaknesses. Of course, in cases of arrested development we still find the same thing in youth and even in maturity. But there, except in rare cases, the attention-soliciting efforts are no longer spontaneous or impulsive, but more largely the result of intentional design and purpose. We are all familiar with the parading pretensions and grandiloquent swagger of the shallow-pated coxcomb, and the loud guffaw and unseemly vociferousness of blatant, self-advertising mediocrity.

Gradually the individual comes to see that his overt fishing for compliments and manifest solicitation of publicity and resulting honors are offensive and defeat their own purpose. If because of a native disinclination to strenuous, especially long-continued effort he still dislikes the "straight and narrow path," there is but one other course left: he must become more skillful in the art of interesting others in self, and so his mastery in the manipulation of covert and insidious devices of self-aggrandizement grows apace. These devices can be conveniently classed under two heads: those of dissimulation and hypocrisy, and those of ingratiation. But they are twin and inseparable.

In the first place, then, he must *feign* those virtues highly valued by society. And, above all things else, he must convince others of his unselfishness. And so, just because he is so very *self-seeking*, he will, when arrived at perfection in his art, be, in his action at least, anything but *self-centered*, and that to the innocent and guileless observer is proof of his unselfishness. Because he is so very consistently selfish or *egoistic* at heart, his outer demeanor will be anything but *egotistic*, and if he be a man of exceptional gifts, he may for years be considered the very embodiment of the spirit of self-abnegation. However, the average mortal cannot ordinarily attain the acme of perfection in the wiles and arts of hypocrisy, although he can long baffle ordinary observers in their attempts to see through his villainy, and what is worse,

may keep those others under suspicion who really are what they appear to be. For, unfortunately, it is easier to deceive than it is to detect deception. The keen eye and ear of the practiced observer, however, are apt even so to detect an occasional gesture that betrays its source or note a word that does not ring true. For in his very endeavor to aim high in his efforts to attain perfection, the deceiver is liable to overshoot his mark. The very persistence with which he keeps his modesty, his virtue, his piety to the front betrays the presence of set purpose. This is especially manifest in the well-known, long-winded, introductory apology and painfully studious avoidance of reference to self noticed in the insincere speaker, standing in marked contrast to the unwitting use of the pronoun "I" by the perfectly genuine speaker who loses himself in his message. As a result the deceiver produces a copy not quite true to the original, even though it be difficult to detect the difference. And so in place of the easy, spontaneous reserve of true modesty we see the self-conscious, modesty-emphasizing obtrusiveness of its baser substitute; in place of the upright, self-respecting lowliness of true humility, the groveling, self-debasing servility of its fictitious counterpart; in place of the seemly and natural retirement of true and genuine piety, the vulgar, sanctimonious importunity of its canting, lip-serving, eye-rolling copy; and in a general way, in place of the simple, unassuming, straightforwardness of virtue, the artful, studied sinuosity of hypocrisy.

But deceiving others into the idea of our possessing real worth is not the only means to which inordinate love of recognition resorts. Preferment is secured not only on the basis of being *esteemed*, but as well on that of being *liked*; for where people like they unwittingly assume the presence of worth, whether justly so or not. And so, in seeking preferment, ambition needs but seek popularity by currying favor. Now what is the basis on which we favor or like others? Briefly, we like those who cause us pleasure rather than pain. So the self-seeking, am-

bitious man has an easy task of winning our good will: negatively, it means for him the need of being considerate to others, and positively, of rendering them agreeable service. Thus it is that he soon possesses himself of that tactful urbanity that never opposes, but always accedes to, the opinions of others and that leads him to become "all things to all men." But here again inordinate self-regard debases the currency that circulates as the token of regard for others, and so, in place of the bland and genial affability of genuine cordiality and good will we have the smooth and oily unctuousness of its inferior counterfeit. And as far as regards the agreeable services rendered to others by self-seeking ambition, they consist in the main of agreeable attentions, for it must be remembered that inordinate, impatient, unworthy ambition is disinclined, on general principles, to over-strenuousness in the direction of real service anywhere. It is easier to secure the desired good will and resulting favor by the bribes of wheedling⁸ flattery, obsequious adulation and subservient truckling, especially to those in high places. The *complimenting* of the "mixer" becomes in the hands of the "jollier" *complete mentiri*, i. e., complete or thoroughgoing lying.⁹ The extreme ends to which misguided ambition can lead by this medium of ingratiation can be seen in the abject spectacle of the self-stultification of the lick-platter parasite, and in the still more loathsome sight of the self-prostitution of his bigger brother, the lick-spittle place hunter.

This same inordinate desire for personal preferment is the source of envy, jealousy and maliciousness toward rivals. Wherever many men are active side by side, with chances for promotion, as in the army, in factories, work-

⁸ Wheedle, probably from the German *wedeln*, to wag with the tail. In the case of the dog we recognize the "wheedling" as the expression of joy in anticipation of the possession of the bone that *he* is to receive; but unfortunately for us, the wheedling of the fawning flatterer is interpreted by our vanity as a genuine interest in *ourselves*.

⁹ As transcribed by Karl Julius Weber in his "Demokritos."

ing-crews, counting houses, the professions, this particular aspect of the workings of ambition can be readily observed. It is largely due to the fact that we have rivals that we are so anxious to let others know about our ability, as in the boastfulness of conceit, or to let them see it, as in self-advertising vanity. When we have advanced beyond this stage, we become more skillful in letting others see what we are doing without letting our efforts to do so become apparent. Where superior worth, lost in the work at hand, does not let "the left hand know what the right doeth," lesser worth, wrapt up in self, is ever thinking of the reward that is to come for what he is doing. So, also, where a man is not content with his present station, but aspires to one that calls for a greater range of ability in a broader field of activity, he is likely to be tempted to be forever trying to show his superiors his ability in those other directions, in place of concentrating his energies on his present tasks. A foreman, for instance, in order to convince his employers of his qualifications for a position calling for greater organizing and executive ability, might spend considerable time and energy in keeping himself posted on what others are doing, in place of confining himself to the particular work assigned to him, and showing his fitness for greater things by being faithful in those which are least.

Where unworthy ambition is intense enough it is, of course, not content with this negative attitude toward rivals, but assumes the more positive attitude seen in the direction of backbiting, slander, traducement, defamation, detraction. Here again it is only the bungling apprentice in the arts and crafts of inordinate ambition who resorts to open underrating, denunciation or calumny. Advancing in the hierarchy we find the covert disparaging, accusation, defamation of the more skillful fellow-craft; the infamous wiles of innuendo of the still more proficient master; the diabolical genius at insinuation of the adept past master. It would be impossible to enumerate all the detestable artifices of these experts in their

impious practices, but who is not familiar with the atrocious "damning with faint praise"? Who has not been witness to that excessive lauding where praise is bound to injure, and its accompanying professing of ignorance where the telling of the well-known truth would help? And who has not met with that maintaining of an eloquent silence that far more effectively undoes the object of its rancor than could any effort of more manly disparagement or arraignment, at the same time that it serves that other purpose of impressing the hearer with a consciousness of the exaltation of that virtue which will say nothing where it cannot speak approvingly?

Occasionally, however, even the adroit expert in the insidious arts of unworthy self-aggrandizement must find freer vent for the malice and envy he feels toward his rivals. But even then his pent-up feelings secure expression under the hypocritical guise of apparently innocent bantering or seemingly good-natured jest, thus securing the relief of easement on the one hand, and at the same time fortifying self against the possibility of deserved chastisement should the butt of the jest unexpectedly see through the real intent of the jester. It must have been this that Pascal had in mind when he said that the "jester is a bad character." If there is anything the ambitious man of this type dreads it is an open fray, for well he realizes that there he might be worsted; he can fight successfully only by skulking in ambush and sending his poisoned shafts from the cover of his cowardly retreat. He stands in no need of the counsel of Lady Macbeth: "Bear welcome in your eye, your hand, your tongue: look like the innocent flower, but be the serpent under't." Full well has he heeded the admonition, "Be wise as the serpent," but in the innocent purity of his devout preoccupation he has inadvertently overlooked its companion injunction to "be harmless as the dove." And if, in spite of herculean efforts to prevent it, he should be unwillingly forced into combat by an ungrateful and worldly rival, it is with a heavy heart that he

finally takes the aggressive, and then of course under that banner which alone is worthy of such extreme measures: disinterested, lofty morality. Heine¹⁰ well says: "And it is always religion and always morality, and always patriotism, with which base villains palliate their attacks. They attack, not from sordid private interest, not from envy of their literary rivals, not from inborn servility, but only to rescue the good Lord, good morals and the fatherland."

Unfortunately, the attitude of untoward ambition to friends presents just as unprepossessing a spectacle. In reality, self-seeking ambition knows no friendship, for friendship calls for an unselfish interest in another, and inordinate ambition sacrifices everything else to its own selfish ends. It helps others as long as that will help self. The author can give no better statement of the relation existing between selfish ambition and disinterested friendship than by quoting from Kuno Fischer's "Life of Bacon":¹¹ "To-day Bacon still made every effort to save the man that had been his benefactor; but when he saw that the graciousness of the queen was at stake, he dropped the friend whose favor he had sought only because he was the favorite of the queen. . . . The collision was not between duty and inclination, but between selfishness and friendship. Essex had loved him with a passionate interest and had overwhelmed him with benefits, to which Bacon had responded with as much devotion as his dispassionate nature admitted of. What he loved in Essex was less the friend than the influential favorite, who was of use to him. The favorite fell, and Bacon's friendship was put to the test that it could not stand. . . . Bacon had to choose between him (Essex) and the queen. . . . At the request of the queen he himself had to support the accusation, and publicly to vindicate the execution of Essex, after it had taken place. He supported the ac-

¹⁰ In the introduction to Part III of his "Salon."

¹¹ First Edition, Leipzig, 1856, pp. 11-19.

cusation, he wrote the vindication, he did both without sympathy, both in such a way as showed plainly that Bacon now had left but one consideration, only the one concern, to please the queen. When the latter made the request of him to vindicate the consummated execution by means of a pamphlet, Bacon answered that he was glad to know that the queen took a fancy to his pen."

Just as disinterested faithfulness to a friend lies beyond the practical comprehension of selfish ambition, so also with unselfish fidelity to duty or adherence to principle, for everywhere selfish interest is paramount. When accompanying a low stage of intellectual development, it readily betrays itself by its sordid narrowness, but in the more highly educated and cultured individual, it becomes more intelligently and coldly calculating, with a keen eye for the benefits and advantages that accrue to him that readily adapts himself to the ever-changing flux of contingencies in his immediate environment. Courage and conviction, to such a one, are impossible conceptions, for they call for stability instead of fickleness, devotion to duty and principle instead of devotion to self, manly resistance in place of knavish yielding. We are all familiar with the human weathercocks that veer with every shifting zephyr of public opinion, the two-faced people that blow hot and cold with the same breath. Much as *honors* are coveted by this amphibian breed, *honor* is to them nothing but a sound, as is so nicely expressed by Falstaff: "Can honor set to a leg? no: or an arm? no: or take away the grief of a wound? no. Honor hath no skill in surgery, then? No. What is honor? A word." And so it is that the very recognition we strive for may bring about in the place of manly adherence to exacting principle and unyielding rigorism, the convenient expediency and flabby opportunism of the time-serving trimmer.

In coming now to a final appraisalment of this powerful disposition toward conduct, it is most patent that the

question of its worth in any individual person depends on what that person aims at in his endeavor to secure the esteem of his fellows. The end with which all set out at this point is the same: to secure the satisfaction of self-esteem that lies in the recognition by others. But at the very outset two different aims present themselves: either one can aim at the securing of *true worth* by the means of moral conduct, or one can aim directly at the securing of *recognition* by means of deception. In the former case every act about to be performed is first referred to the crucial touchstone of our own moral judgment; in the latter it is instead referred to the uncertain criterion of the incalculable changes in our unstable environment; in the first, the consideration is as to the rightness or wrongness of the act to be performed; in the second, the concern is as to its popularity or unpopularity. We cannot as readily deceive ourselves as we can others, for we can see the selfish motive concealed from the outside observer. Where in exceptional cases a person succeeds in deceiving himself, it is always one who pursues the second course; as a result of his trying so long to convince others of his genuineness, he finally becomes deluded into that belief himself.¹² In a general way, the more the individual inclines toward the former course, the more salutary the results, and the more he tends in the other direction, the more mischievous the ultimate consequences.

Even in the case of intense ambition striving to realize itself by honest and honorable means, there are dangers: on the one hand, that of overwork, which cuts down so many of our ablest and worthiest men in their prime, and on the other, that of refraining from all the pleasing graces and the little kindnesses of social intercourse because of a just detestation of the infamous use to which

¹² Perhaps the best example of this kind in literature that the author is familiar with, is Fritz Nettenmaier in Ludwig's novel, "Between Heaven and Earth," a novel which has probably never been excelled, if equaled, in the matter of keen psychological analysis.

they are so often degraded and because of the fear of being drawn into the same abominable practices, thus developing a serious gravity often mistaken for forbidding severity, if not cold indifference or even self-important haughtiness. But even in the case of the unprepossessing angularity and unapproachable austerity that unfortunately result in cases, what noble dignity there is to simple-minded sincerity compared to the abject beggarliness of adroit and subtle duplicity, and that in spite of the engaging blandness, the taking suavity and the captivating good-fellowship in which the latter is so apt to array itself!

In view of the potent influence toward both socially desirable and undesirable conduct that lies in self-esteem and the love of recognition, it is of the utmost importance that teachers pay heed to these dispositions and bring proper influences to bear on them to the end of securing their coöperation in the work of education. The first concern must be to place respect or esteem on the right basis, and that not only by theoretical appeal to the intellect, but more especially by the practical appeal to the imitative nature of the child by the example of the teacher. Could every child be sufficiently impressed with the thought that he will be esteemed because of the worthy use he makes of his abilities, even though they be mediocre or inferior, there would be no such strong desire on his part to attain by illegitimate means those heights that he cannot attain by an honorable use of the powers with which he has been endowed. Were our educational agencies to be controlled with this aim in view, it would not be so difficult to secure the thoroughness of the real worker in place of the superficiality of the ambitious eye-servant. Then we could consistently urge our pupils to take as their motto the words of Schiller:

Who something perfect would perform,
To something great give birth,
Must gather, quiet and unwearied e'er,
The greatest power in smallest sphere.

Just because the undesirable features of the love of recognition are brought out where it is inordinate and conscious of its own relative inability as compared to that of rivals, it is clear that in order to secure desirable results, ability must be improved, ambition curbed and judgment developed as to what is really worthy and therefore worth while. In the language of Lao-tse, we must "weaken ambition" and "strengthen backbone." If we do that we can have some assurance that our efforts will be instrumental in bringing about a life absorbed in service to those higher interests worthy of the dignity of man's estate, instead of a life devoted to a fruitless chase after the elusive rainbow of evanescent fame.

For what are men, who grasp at praise sublime,
But bubbles on the rapid stream of time,
That rise and fall, that swell, and are no more,
Born and forgot, ten thousand in an hour.—*Young*.

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THE MORALS OF AN IMMORALIST—FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE.

ALFRED W. BENN.

II.

IT has been disputed whether Nietzsche's superman was intended by his prophet to stand for a new animal species, or for a new and improved variety of human being, or, finally, for a sporadic type of individual excellence, cropping up occasionally in the existing state of civilization. So far as the name and notion have become popular it seems to be generally understood in the last sense. The superman is commonly identified with a coxcomb whose opinion of his own superiority to the rest of the species